Introduction
Beijing's key role in approving multilateral sanctions directed against North Korea, its failure to strictly enforce those sanctions, and its deepening economic engagement with the country has led to widespread debate regarding the causes of this seemingly inconsistent or even duplicitous approach. From a social constructivist perspective, one argument has been that China's actor identity is composed of various contradictory role conceptions, some of which are based in the country's past and some commensurate with China's new-found global stature.
As a result, there has been a deepening contradiction between China's desire to be seen as responsible global partner that does not associate with rogue states, and its identity as an ostensibly socialist one-party state that refuses to engage in actions that could lead to North Korea's downfall (Noesselt 2014) . Other social constructivists have made reference to China's more traditional norms that are alleged to shape the country's relations with its near abroad.
These include an emphasis on stability in China's border regions combined with a siege mentality born out of a history of encroachment by imperialist powers. In this approach, relations with North Korea are further problematised, however, by China's expectation of deference on the part of its near abroad alongside a perceived sense of cultural superiority amidst Confucian expectations of reciprocity (Easley & Park 2016) .
From a mainstream realpolitik perspective, on the other hand, it has typically been argued that China's North Korea policy should be viewed as a straightforward reflection of Beijing's strategic interests in maintaining North Korea as a buffer state for the purposes of countering US influence in the region. This imperative is seen as having its origins in the early 20th century when the Korean peninsula formed the corridor through which imperial Japan facilitated its military expansion into China. As such, support of North Korea as a bulwark against US encroachment can be seen as a consistent objective since the Korean War (Habib 2016, p.60) . Thus, while China and North Korea in reality share little in common in terms of historical ties, ideological stance, political and economic programmes, or diplomatic interaction, Beijing fears that Korean reunification may lead to US military presence on China's doorstep and thus prefers maintenance of the status quo (Ji 2001, p.398) . This means that while Pyongyang's nuclear tests may bring some short term disruption to Sino-North Korean relations, China's engagement with the country is likely to continue as long as tensions remain in US-China relations remain tense (Kim 2016; Kong 2017) . By extension, Beijing's failure to fully enforce the multilateral sanctions that it has signed up to is consistent with the fear of the negative impact that a North Korean collapse may have on regime security means that it is unlikely that Beijing will take actions leading to instability in North Korea (Horowitz & Ye 2006) . Furthermore, China's deepening economic engagement with North Korea can also be seen as functional to this broader grand strategy.
In this paper, we argue that these views pay insufficient attention to the ongoing transformation of the Chinese state that has taken place over the past four decades and the implications that the ongoing decentralisation of political authority in China has had for the latter's relations with North Korea. We argue that the Chinese state has undergone a profound process of rescaling in the form of the marked decentralisation of authority from the centre towards provincial, municipal and other local actors. Existing social constructivist and realpolitik approaches thereby pay insufficient attention to how the key agents in day-to-day Sino-North Korean relations are increasingly local governments alongside profit-oriented private actors, both of whom pursue goals that are not reducible to those of the central government authorities. What this means is that accounts that focus on realpolitik or the norms underpinning Beijing's grand strategy are only able to give a partial account of bilateral relations between the two countries. In reality, the rescaling of political authority and the diversification of actors involved in China's external relations means that the country's relations with North Korea has come to be underpinned by a broader range of concerns and imperatives than simply those captured via analysis of the high politics of Beijing-Pyongyang relations.
However, we also focus on how this rescaling of the Chinese state has led to increasingly uneven development within the country and on the implications of efforts to facilitate development in China's northeast for Sino-North Korean relations. Existing analyses of these efforts have tended to emphasise their origins within the context of China's increasingly tense relations with the United States (see Lee 2014) , thereby seeing geo-economic strategies largely as a means of achieving geopolitical objectives (Yoon & Lee 2013) . In contrast, we focus on their role as responses on the part of political actors at multiple scales to the increasing unevenness of China's development and to the challenges this unevenness poses to social stability and to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Drawing on the literature on rescaling and the decentralisation of political authority, we examine how the diversification of governmental and private actors constitutive of Sino-North Korean relations serve to problematise the state-centredness of social constructivist and realpolitik approaches.
As we argue, ongoing processes of decentralisation and marketisation have resulted in new patterns of geographical unevenness and in new forms of social struggles, particularly within China's northeast. This has led to state-led re-imagining of national space in which North Korea has come to play an increasingly important role in efforts to facilitate economic recovery in the northeast. In this sense, North Korea has increasingly come to play the role of spatial fix for Chinese manufacturing capital, particularly in the northeastern border regions.
This ongoing process of rescaling and the resulting emergence of new cross-border flows of capital and labour suggests an emerging pattern of Sino-North Korean relations that is by no means static but is in considerable flux.
The Rescaling of Political Authority in China
Existing Realpolitik and Constructivist approaches to Sino-North Korean relations are essentially based upon a static "black box" conception of the state. By naturalising the state as a transhistorical concept, such approaches fail to convincingly explore either the state's historical origins or its ongoing transformations. State-centric conceptions thus fall into what John Agnew has referred to as the "territorial trap," whereby states are typically reified as fixed units of sovereign space. These approaches serve, however, to de-historicise and decontextualise processes of state formation and transformation as well as obscure the interaction between processes operating at different scales (Agnew 1994, p.59) . Though it is debatable whether state-centric approaches have ever adequately captured the changing relationship between the state and the international system (Lacher 2003) , they are particularly inadequate given the profound transformations that territorial states have undergone since the world economic crisis of the 1970s. As Bob Jessop has argued, the widespread rescaling of political authority that has taken place globally over the past four decades has typically taken the form of the relative denationalisation of statehood. This process has involved the transfer of powers previously located at the national-territorial level up towards international organisations, downwards to regional or local states, or outwards to cross-national alliances between local metropolitan or regional states. This process amounts to a de-and re-territorialisation of authority that has served to radically reshape hitherto mutually exclusive, formally sovereign, spatially segmented national states (Jessop 2004, p.15) .
In this sense, the effort to escape the "territorial trap" of state-centrism does not entail a denial of the state's continued relevance as a locus of social power, but rather a rethinking of the meaning of both state territoriality and political space (Brenner 1999, p.41) . In contrast to widespread arguments in the 1990s concerning the "retreat of the state" (Ohmae 1990; Strange 1996) , the reorientation of the state's development policies towards the promotion of global economic competition has been closely intertwined with this re-territorialisation and rescaling of the state. This process of rescaling should therefore be seen not simply as a defensive reaction against globalisation but as a concerted strategy to create new scales of state regulation to facilitate and coordinate the globalisation process. Rescaling can thus be interpreted as a strategy of political restructuring that aims to enhance the locationally specific productive forces of each level of state territorial organisation (Brenner 1999, p.66) .
A corollary of this process, however, is that fragmented and decentralised state apparatuses and quasi-market actors have increasingly pursued their own independent interests and agendas overseas, generating conflict-ridden, incoherent policy output (Hameiri & Jones 2016, p.73) .
It is important here, however, not simply to describe these processes of re-territorialisation and rescaling but to explain them with reference to struggles between social forces, since as Gough (2004) argues, changes of scale in political-economic processes are often associated with changes in class relations and are an outcome of social contestations. The nexus between social struggles and the rescaling of political authority is also closely linked to and is facilitative of what David Harvey refers to as the "spatial fix." As Harvey argues, limits to capital accumulation in any one geographical locale can create a surplus of capital that cannot profitability be re-invested. However, such limits emerging from the internal contradictions of capital can be resolved through a process of geographical restructuring and expansion (Harvey 1982, p.390) . The resulting spatial fix thus involves the export of money capital, commodities or productive capacities or imports of fresh labour powers from other regions as a means of overcoming existing limits to capital accumulation (Harvey 1982, pp.427-428) .
Labour struggles and rising labour costs can be a particularly powerful driver of such processes (Silver 2003) , as can the need for new sources of raw materials in order to maintain rapid economic growth. Thus, as Harvey argues, it is the "irresolvable" internal contradictions of capitalism that have accounted for its extraordinary expansive dynamics since its emergence. Continual spatial re-ordering and geographical expansion is, therefore, as central to capitalism as technological change (Harvey 2001, p.24) .
This framework based on the rescaling of the state and the spatial fix therefore provides an alternative to widespread understandings of China as Westphalian state par excellence. In line with the critique offered above, such understandings remain unable to capture the radical shift from the self-contained pattern of auto-centric development pursued under Mao Zedong towards the transnationalised economy of the post-1978 era. They tend to neglect the decentralisation of political authority and pluralisation of actors constitutive of China's external relations, and in particular, how such processes have occurred in response to the internal and external challenges to the ruling CCP's legitimacy. These challenges have taken the form of social and class-based struggles from below as well as external challenges in the form of China's position within the uneven development in the East Asian region and beyond.
Deng Xiaoping's decision in the late 1970s to pursue economic liberalisation can thus be understood as a strategic response to the stalling of the country's economic development and to shifts in China's external environment. Economic stagnation was a result of the systematic inefficiency and waste associated with Soviet-style central planning and the subsequent failure of developmental Maoism to establish a viable alternative accumulation regime based on mass mobilisation. By the time of the death of Mao Zedong, there was as a result a widespread social mandate for change within China, particularly amongst those who had suffered under the political mobilisations of the Mao era and those who worked in the agricultural collectives or state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and were subject to often irrational and stifling administrative direction from above (White 1993, pp.21-50) . The challenge of addressing this economic stagnation was viewed as particularly acute given the context of the extraordinary growth rates achieved by the US allies of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Uneven development in East Asia both exerted a strong impression on China's leadership of the country's economic backwardness as well as provided practical policy alternatives (Vogel 2013) . Together with the shifting dynamics of the Cold War in the form of the Sino-Soviet split and rapprochement with the US, this provided the impetus and opportunity for China to pursue an outward-oriented strategy of greater integration into the international division of labour (Cumings 1989 ). Contemporaneous with this upward shift has been the decentring of political authority down towards the provincial, city, and county level. Planning and decision making powers in particular have been transferred from the central government down to local governments, thereby providing opportunities for local governments to stimulate economic growth (Wei 2001, p.9) . Political decentralisation has therefore also been a process of marketisation, whereby the dismantling of the state planning and allocation system has resulted in partystate elites at all levels losing some ability to control economic activity. At the same time, power has passed into the hands of non-state actors, including managers, producers, consumers, and increasingly, private and foreign economic actors (Breslin 2000, p.209) . It is important to note, however, that there have also been periodic and partial reversals to this trend, such as with the introduction of the tax sharing system in 1994 (Ahmad et al. 2002) , thus suggesting the emergence of a contested multi-scalar structure rather than a complete rescaling away from the central state.
The question of the precise relationship between local state and capital emerging from this process has been widely debated. Jean Oi has argued, for example, that local states and markets in China should not necessarily be viewed as being in an antagonistic relationship with each other. Fiscal reform assigned local governments property rights over increased income, thereby creating strong incentives for local officials to pursue economic development in their regions. With parallels to the Northeast Asian developmental states of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, this merging of state and economy characterises a new institutional development model referred to by Oi as "local state corporatism," whereby local government coordinates economic enterprises as if it were a diversified business corporation (Oi 1992, pp.100-102; see also Blecher & Shue 2001) . One manifestation of this new scalar configuration has been the emergence of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) as an example of the downward shift in political authority, thereby demonstrating that decentralisation was simultaneously a process of internationalisation (Breslin 2000, p.211) . However, while China's reforms were in many respects a conscious emulation of the Northeast Asian developmental state model, the relative lateness in world-historical time of China's integration into the regional and global economy meant that "national development" was a much more difficult goal to pursue. In a context whereby transnational production networks have become dominant, China's post-1978 reforms took the form of "shallow integration" into the global economy (Steinfeld 2004) , whereby economic growth became heavily reliant on inward FDI and overwhelmingly centred on the Eastern and Southern coastal regions. By the early 2000s, however, China's development was increasingly beset by the overaccumulation of capital, as manifest in the country's towering foreign exchange reserves (Su 2012, p.502) . Beijing thereby responded to this challenge by promoting a "going out" strategy, whereby domestic SOEs were encouraged to invest abroad to secure cheaper labour, resources and achieve geographical or institutional proximity to markets (Yeung & Liu 2008) .
The outward expansion of China's SOEs should not be viewed as simply directed by the state, however. Deng Xiaoping's reforms meant that SOEs became increasingly profit driven and characterised by the kind of separation between ownership and management that could be found in Western firms. Indeed, Chinese SOEs are often larger in size and capacity than the government agencies that are supposedly meant to provide oversight over them (GonzalezVicente 2011, pp.405-409 ). Deng's reforms also led to the rapid expansion in private enterprises, many of which have also been increasingly internationalising their activities through overseas direct investment (Ge & Wang 2013) . This suggests that the decentralisation of political authority in China has led to an institutional arrangement that is in fact much less coherent and unified than that of the developmental states of Northeast Asia in which the state exerted considerable influence over the investment activities of enterprises (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990 ). Indeed, as Jude Howell argues, the Chinese state should be understood more as a polymorphous state that assumes multiple, complex forms and behaviours across time and space, and defying any definition which reduces it to a single actor (Howell 2006, p.275 ).
China's post-1978 reforms and the concomitant rescaling of political authority has, however, created new challenges for the CCP due to the manner in which these processes have exacerbated regional disparities in the country. Prior to the reforms, China's fiscal system was characterised by centralised revenue collection and inter-regional resource transfers. As noted, however, fiscal decentralisation allowed localities to retain certain portions of their revenues for local spending. The reforms also increased local governments' discretion over the investment process, and the divergence in local inputs play a key role in explaining the dramatic unevenness (Wei 2001, pp.10-12) . Indeed, the central state deliberately treated provinces differently during the process of decentralisation, with coastal provinces given rights to seek foreign investment earlier than inland provinces (Breslin 2000, p.215) . The resulting regional disparities thus posed serious challenges in terms of political stability. As we argue in the following section, the economic decline of China's northeast has been a key manifestation of this process, and as a result, regional authorities have placed increased emphasis on economic cooperation with North Korea as a means of revitalising the region.
The Northeast Phenomenon and State-led Responses
In the midst of China's deepening regional disparities, the country's northeast remains somewhat unique in that it constitutes the country's primary rust belt but also includes relatively undeveloped border regions. Following 1949, the Chinese state had made largescale investments in heavy and chemical industries in the region, to the extent that it became known as the "cradle of Chinese industry" (Chung et al. 2009, p.110) . Many of China's largest SOEs in the steel, chemicals, heavy equipment, automobiles and defence equipment sectors were located in the region. The northeast has, however, fared badly in the context of the growing inter-provincial inequality that characterized China's growth during the 1990s (Fan and Sun, 2008) . As noted, this was due to the fact that the reforms led to a shift in the locus of China's economic dynamism towards the labour-intensive export-oriented industries located in the coastal regions and from SOEs to private and foreign-invested enterprises.
This "Northeast Phenomenon" (dongbei xianzhuang) was not simply a result of the region's ageing heavy industrial structure, however. The region's relative geographical isolation and the fact that both Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces are landlocked meant that the northeast was ill-placed to take advantage of the investment by overseas Chinese networks that formed the impetus of China's post-1978 growth. In addition, the northeast was relatively slow to encourage inward direct investment from nearby South Korea and Japan. Official economic cooperation between northeast China and these countries remained limited until the 1990s.
Due to this combination of factors, the northeast's trade reliance in 2001 was just 20.37 per cent, less than half of the national average of 43.57 per cent, and foreign direct investment to the region recorded US$ 3.19 billion at the same year, accounting for just 6.89 per cent of the national total (Kim 2012, p.45) . With its ageing industrial base and limited new investment, the northeast's share in China's overall industrial production saw a sharp decline from 17 per cent in the late 1970s to just 8.6 in 2002 (Kang 2005, p.194) . The northeast's economic decline has been of increasing concern to the authorities.
Consequently, local governments in the region took a leading role since the 1990s in seeking to revitalise the region through cooperation with neighbouring countries. For example, the Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP), sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme, was aimed at establishing a Northeast Asian economic regime centred on China, North Korea, South Korea, Russia and Mongolia, with Japan adopting the position of observer. TRADP aimed to promote regional economic integration through a number of mechanisms including plans to establish a duty-free shipping and processing zone inclusive of the North Korean cities of Rajin and Chongjin, the Chinese cities of Hunchun and Yanji, and the Russian city of Vladivostok (Kim 2001, pp.388-390) . However, TRADP's progress was erratic due to the security tensions on the Korean peninsula and limited interest on the part of corporations in neighbouring countries in investing in the Sino-North Korean border area of the Tumen River.
i The project thus failed to achieve the goals of the Jilin provincial authorities, who were its most enthusiastic supporter. Furthermore, there were tensions between central and local governments in a number of member states with regards to the extent to which cross-border regional cooperation should occur (Hughes 2002 It is true that such concerns may be dissipating to a degree due to outward migration of around one million ethnic Koreans over the past two decades. Nonetheless, the northeastern border regions benefit from a number of central government politics designed to promote border trade as a means of tackling similar concerns in China's border regions more generally (Thompson 2011, p.14) .
As a result of these challenges, the central and provincial governments' increased emphasis 
Decentralisation and Sino-North Korea Economic Cooperation
China's implementation of cross-border infrastructure projects with North Korea has also taken the form of more targeted regional development plans. In The role in which cooperation with North Korea plays in such regional development plans needs to be qualified somewhat. The position that local governments in the region take towards such cooperation tends to be shaped by geography. Liaoning Province already has coastal access, for example, and the province as a whole arguably has less to gain from investments in improving transport infrastructure with North Korea. The border city of Dandong, on the other hand, is heavily reliant on cross-border economic exchange, and as discussed in more detail below, has taken the lead in several important cooperative initiatives.
As a landlocked province, Jilin Province, and the Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture in particular, have more to gain in terms of cooperation with North Korea (Lee 2014, pp.185-187 This is despite the fact that both regional development projects in the northeast explicitly seek to strengthen the northeast's economic cooperation with neighbouring countries through the construction of rail, road, electricity networks, pipelines and economic corridors (Government of China 2015).
Beijing's increasing reluctance to pursue large-scale cooperation projects with North Korea does reflect in part the increased tensions over the latter's nuclear programme, but more importantly, it reflects the fact that many existing high profile projects have simply failed to progress as planned. For example, the New Yalu River Bridge remains unopened despite having been completed in 2014. Indeed, there has apparently been no effort on the North Korean side to connect the bridge to the existing road network, and thus, the bridge has remained unused and, for many observers, stands as a testament to the futility of engagement with North Korea. Despite Beijing's apparent change of heart, however, regional governments in the northeast have maintained efforts to pursue smaller scale economic cooperation projects with North Korea despite increasingly stringent international sanctions. 
Engagement with North Korea as Spatial Fix
The rescaling of political authority in post-1978 China has meant that Sino-North Korean relations have come to be shaped by a range of state actors at the central and regional level, and as such, China-North Korean relations cannot be reduced to a singular geopolitical logic.
However, processes of decentralisation and marketisation have also meant a shift away from government towards private actors primarily oriented towards the pursuit of profit. Indeed, in contrast to the aided-trade and government commodities of the past, the vast majority of This integration of North Korea into regional and global production networks has occurred mainly as a result of rising labour costs within China. This reflects in part the dynamic whereby social struggles at the point of production and the threat that they pose to social and political stability have led to government reforms designed to manage tensions through piecemeal reform from above. More specifically, the potential of labour unrest as demonstrated in China's 2010 strike wave along with the manner in which the global financial crisis exposed the vulnerabilities of the country's export-dependent industrialisation model have led to a shift in government strategy away from export-oriented manufacturing towards increasing domestic consumption (Gray & Jang 2015) . China has thus seen rapid increases in the minimum wage and enterprises have been faced with further costs related to social insurance payments and other employee benefits. Demographic shifts associated with the one child policy have added to difficulties faced by Chinese firms in recruiting workers (Cai 2007) .
For clothing manufacturers in the more prosperous coastal provinces, the challenge of rising wages has led to spatial relocation of production either to China's inland/western regions or to overseas low-wage sites (Zhu & Pickles 2014) . However, the latter strategy of "going out" has increasingly been adopted by clothing manufacturers in the northeast, particularly in the border regions adjacent to North Korea. Indeed, China's northeast has by no means been spared from the rapid increases in wages. In 2010 alone, for example, the average minimum wage in Liaoning province rose by 28.6 per cent, in Jilin province by 26.2 per cent, and in Heilongjiang province by 29.4 per cent (Jin et al. 2012, p.12) . Though labour shortages first emerged in the coastal export-oriented industrial regions, they have subsequently spread to China's inner provinces, to the West, and to the northeast. Despite increases in wages, northeastern labour-intensive factories in the clothing and footwear sectors, for example, have reportedly experienced greater hardship in recruiting workers, with some of them operating at less than half of their capacity. Dandong city has experienced one of the most serious labour shortages in Liaoning province, and the number of apparel companies in the city in the early 2010s has declined from 120 to 70 (Choi et al. 2015, p.109 ).
As Furthermore, the Jilin provincial authorities regard clothing manufactured in North Korea under this CBP arrangement as domestically produced, thereby giving them preference in terms of quality and safety inspections (Bae & Yoon 2015, pp.167-168; Choi et al. 2015, pp.108-109) .
In addition to CBP-based production, there has also since the early 2010s been a marked rise 
Conclusion
While China's rise has led to an increase in the country's influence within the structures of global economic and political governance, it continues to pursue a strategy of engagement with North Korea despite Beijing's support of increasingly stringent UN-mandated sanctions.
As we have argued, contemporary analyses of this apparent paradox are arguably constrained by their state-centric analytical frameworks that serve to reduce relations between the two countries to realpolitik considerations or to relatively static norms. Such views neglect, however, the ongoing multi-faceted transformation of the Chinese state since the late 1970s, and in particular, the profound rescaling of political authority along with the diversification of public and private actors involved in the conduct of relations with neighbouring countries. As the key agents involved in Sino-North Korean economic relations have seen a relative shift from central to local government and to local enterprises, relations between the two countries are increasingly characterised by multiple and at times contradictory goals. Certainly, the relative autonomy of the local governments should also not be exaggerated as the extent to which regional authorities can adopt policies that directly contradict the intentions of Beijing is highly constrained and it would be misleading to view regional initiatives in external affairs as in direct conflict with the policies of the central government (Cheung & Tang 2001, p.93) . Nonetheless, the emergence of a multi-scalar political structure has meant that China's approach to North Korea is irreducible to any single geopolitical logic and is instead characterised by a multiplicity of goals that compete for dominance. Beijing's apparent displeasure with North Korea's nuclear programme, the importance of North Korean for China's domestic stability and particularly for the revitalisation of the northeastern border regions means that it seems unlikely that this will do much to reverse the situation in which Sino-North Korean relations are being driven by private enterprises, underpinned by local governments and public and private companies.
Certainly, Beijing can and does take actions aimed at expressing its displeasure with Pyongyang over its nuclear and missile tests. China's banning of coal imports from North Korea in 2017 is one such example, though it remains to be seen as to the extent to which this ban will be enforced and whether it will simply drive more of the trade into the realm of the informal economy. A stringent application of the ban would no doubt have a significant impact on North Korea's foreign exchange earnings, though it should be noted that economic exchange in other areas, including the outsourcing of apparel manufacturing, has continued to grow and trade in minerals banned under UN sanctions is still reportedly taking place . As such, the substance of Sino-North Korean relations is likely to continue to follow market dynamics rather than the vicissitudes of high politics between Beijing and Pyongyang.
Though not primarily the focus of this paper, this analysis has important implications for thinking about potential alternative strategies of engagement with North Korea. China's engagement with the country has taken on quite a different form to the more territoriallymotivated engagement strategy pursued by the South Korean government under the auspices of the erstwhile Sunshine Policy (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) ). China's appproach has been much more based around interaction between local actors in both countries. There has been more in the way of business-to-business interaction and, as a result, people-to-people contact. South Korean engagement on the other hand was conducted through much more constrained channels.
Encounters between North and South Koreans were more strictly regulated, and as a result, there was less space for any transformative impact. Though South Korean local governments did participate in inter-Korean exchange, their counterpart was often more likely to be the North Korean central government (Marumoto 2008) . Indeed, it was partly the highly constrained nature of inter-Korean exchange that led it to be criticised by South Korean conservatives (Son 2009 ). As a result, it can be argued that China's engagement with North
Korea has served to encourage the ongoing process of marketisation in the latter, and indeed, there is evidence to suggest that North Korea is in the process of copying market institutions found in China (Reilly 2014) . This grassroots exchange has played a key role in the broader recovery of the North Korean economy. There are signs that North Korean society is becoming more pluralistic, and that an entrepreneurial class may be emerging: if so, a profound transformation is underway in the country. This serves to underline the fact that in the context of the increasingly tense stand of between North Korea and the United States, an appreciation of the multi-scalar dimensions of potential engagement strategies may provide the basis for devising alternative approaches to engaging with North Korea.
i In 2005, TRADP was re-branded as the Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI) following the transfer of full ownership from the UNDP to the member states. However, North Korea withdrew from the GTI in 2009 as a result of increasing tensions surrounding North Korea's nuclear programme but also due to the disappointing results of the TRADP/GTI and the failure for expected levels of FDI to materialise. Given North Korea's geographical centrality to the broader multilateral Tumen River cooperation, this withdrawal was a major blow to multilateral efforts to development the region. As such, the results of the TRADP/GTI can be seen as having fallen well short of its often grandiose aims.
ii Interviews with managers of Chinese trading companies importing anthracite from North Korea, July 2016.
iii Interview with Hunchun municipal government official, July 2016. iv Interviews with factory managers, Hunchun industrial zone, July 2016. v Interviews with IT staff, Dandong, November 2012.
